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In the contingent valuation literature, both anchoring and acquiescence biases pose problems when
using an iterative bidding game to infer willingness to pay. Anchoring bias occurs when the willingness
to pay estimate is sensitive to the initially presented starting value. Acquiescence bias occurs when
survey respondents exhibit a tendency to answer 'yes' to questions, regardless of their true preferences.
More generally, whenever a survey format is used and not all of those contacted participate, selection
bias raises concerns about the representativeness of the sample. 
In this paper, we estimate students' willingness to pay for student health care at Stanford University
while accounting for all of these biases. As there is no cost sharing for students, we assess willingness
to pay by having a random sample of students play an online iterative bidding game. Our main results
are that (1) demand for student health care is elastic by conventional standards; (2) ignoring anchoring
bias would lead to a substantially biased measure of the demand elasticity; (3) there is evidence for
acquiescence bias in student answers to the opening question of the iterative bidding game and failure
to address this leads to the biased conclusion that demand is inelastic; and (4) standard selection correction
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In the contingent valuation literature, both anchoring and acquiescence bi-
ases pose problems when using an iterative bidding game to infer willingness
to pay. Anchoring bias occurs when the willingness to pay estimate is sensi-
tive to the initially presented starting value. Acquiescence bias occurs when
survey respondents exhibit a tendency to answer ‘yes’ to questions, regardless
of their true preferences. More generally, whenever a survey format is used
and not all of those contacted participate, selection bias raises concerns about
the representativeness of the sample. It is diﬃcult to adjust simultaneously
for all these sources of bias when analyzing survey data to infer willingness to
pay from an iterative bidding game. In this paper, we demonstrate a simple
methodology to do so.
On most college campuses across the country, student health centers pro-
vide care to students at no cost at the point of service. At Stanford University
speciﬁcally, all students are automatically enrolled in a ﬁrst tier health care
plan that provides services through the student health center (Vaden Health
Center) with no cost sharing by students.1 There are approximately 25,000
visits to Vaden annually, and over 67 percent of the roughly 12,000 enrolled
students make such visits each year. Optimal coinsurance, which balances
the marginal beneﬁt of risk pooling with the marginal cost of moral hazard
(Pauly, 1968), depends in part upon the price elasticity of demand for health
care by students as well as the magnitude of the demand. Thus, determining
this elasticity and willingness to pay are important to determining whether
the imposition of cost-sharing would improve social welfare.
The lack of cost sharing by students prevents us from measuring the de-
mand elasticity using standard revealed preference methods. We thus turn to
contingent valuation methods. We conduct a representative online survey of
Stanford students in which students play an iterative bidding game designed
to reveal their willingness to pay for visits to Vaden. In this game, respon-
dents are asked whether they would pay a speciﬁed amount for the good
or service at hand. If respondents answer in the aﬃrmative, the amount is
incrementally increased until their willingness to pay is reached. Similarly, if
respondents answer in the negative, the amount is incrementally decreased
until their maximum willing to pay is reached.
1First tier health care consists of care given from nurses and primary care physicians at
the student health center. Referrals to specialists and the provision of prescription drugs
are not considered part of ﬁrst tier care.
1Contingent valuation methods, such as the one we employ, are subject to
well known biases. Two such biases are due to anchoring (when the starting
bracket amount inﬂuences the willingness to pay estimate) and acquiescence
(the tendency to answer ‘yes’ to a question when it is thought to be the
socially desirable response).
If anchoring is present, the higher the starting bid, the higher the stated
willingness to pay estimates provided by respondents. Many studies in the
health economics literature have used contingent valuation methods to mea-
sure demand elasticities without accounting for anchoring bias. One excep-
tion is Smith (2006) who experimented with payment cards with various
starting brackets and found that the willingness to pay estimate is sensitive
to the starting bracket. Two studies have explicitly tested for anchoring bias
in the context of an iterative bidding game, with one ﬁnding an eﬀect and
the other no eﬀect (Stalhammar, 1996; OBrien and Viramontes, 1994), and
since their main aim was to test for the bias, neither study corrects for the
bias in its measurement of willingness to pay. In this paper, we adapt an
econometric model developed by Herriges and Shogren (1996) in the environ-
mental economics literature to correct our elasticity estimate for anchoring
bias.
Classically, acquiescence bias occurs when there is a social pressure to
agree to a particular survey question (for example, “Is racism bad?”). How-
ever, such tendencies may manifest themselves even in situations in which
social pressure is doubtful (see Hurd and van Soest, 2003). Both Ryan et al.
(2004) and Blumenschein et al. (2001) argue that acquiescence bias plays
a large role in explaining high willingness to pay estimates in contingent
valuation studies of the value of health care.
Last, selection bias might manifest itself when those who respond to the
survey diﬀer from the whole population in salient ways. In our data col-
lection, we provided randomized participation incentives to survey partici-
pants. We take advantage of this randomization to adjust our estimates for
non-response bias using both standard and newer methods from the econo-
metrics literature.
2 Data
In early 2006, we conducted a survey of the Stanford University student
body. Stanford provided us with a randomly selected list of two thousand
2undergraduates and two thousand graduate students. We elicited student
participation through email contact (up to three times if students did not
respond initially). In order to increase the response rate, we stressed the
support of the Stanford student government organization for this study and
we provided a ﬁnancial inducement. Four hundred randomly chosen students
who ﬁlled out the survey were given a $5 Amazon gift certiﬁcate. The rest
of the students were oﬀered no compensation for participating in the study.
The typical time to complete the survey was under ﬁve minutes. Overall,
30.8% of students responded to the survey.
The survey consisted of a part that included the iterative bidding game
and a part asking about demographic and health background information.
The iterative bidding game was structured to allow for tests of anchoring
and acquiescence biases. First, respondents were randomly assigned to one
of four bidding games, each of which had a diﬀerent starting bid ($5, $20,
$35, and $50). This strategy is called random bracket entry. We picked these
bid levels, based on pilot runs of the survey, to be within a typical student’s
budget constraint.
Second, the questions used neutral wording that avoided any “yes” or
“no” questions and instead asked what the respondent would have done if an
x dollar co-payment was charged. Hurd and van Soest (2003), using national
consumption and income surveys, ﬁnd that acquiescence bias can be avoided
by slightly reformulating the question to more neutral wording. To explicitly
test if the neutral wording made a diﬀerence, a separate random sample of
students was assigned to bidding games that contained purely ‘yes’ or ‘no’
questions.
The remaining questions from the survey were used to address three main
concerns raised by cost sharing: how a co-payment would generally aﬀect
health outcomes and how a co-payment would speciﬁcally aﬀect low-income
students and those with poor health backgrounds. We included questions
about the student’s reason for his or her last visit, how long the reason for
the visit existed, and how the student ranked the urgency of his or her reason
for visiting. To address questions regarding diﬀerential willingness to pay by
low-income students and those in poor health, we included socio-economic
status and health background questions in the survey.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics about about the demographics of the
study population of 883 students. Stanford students tend come from families
with high levels of educational attainment. Family income levels (collected
only for graduate students) are, not surprisingly for a collection of graduate
3students, low. A substantial proportion of the student population is on
ﬁnancial aid.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics about the health status of the study
population and their use of student health services. Students typically report
themselves to be in very good or excellent health. Few students have a chronic
medical condition. When they do use student health services, they tend to
arrive with non-urgent complaints.2
Average reported willingness to pay for a visit (taken as the midpoint
of the ﬁnal interval in the iterative bidding game played each respondent)
increases sharply with the randomly assigned starting bracket. Ignoring an-
choring would thus lead, almost certainly, to a biased estimate of willingness
to pay. We also see evidence of acquiescence bias as given by a higher per-
cent of students posed the non-neutral wording responding in the aﬃrmative
to the ﬁrst bracket question.
3 Anchoring Bias
We adapt a Bayesian learning model, developed by Herriges and Shogren
(1996) to measure willingness to pay in the environmental economics context,
to our problem. The intuition behind the learning model is that people do not
have a point willingness to pay for a given good before they are asked about
it in the survey. Rather, each person has a distribution over their willingness
to pay that represents their beliefs about it. These beliefs are based on their
past experiences with the speciﬁc good and related goods. Once respondents
are exposed to the ﬁrst bracket, the information the respondents held prior to
viewing the bracket is then updated by the information in the ﬁrst bracket,
which signals to them the value of the “correct” willingness to pay. As
a result, rather than comparing their “true” willingness to pay to all the
subsequent brackets, respondents compare their “true” willingness to pay
with the new information provided by the ﬁrst bracket to form the “revised”
willingness to pay, which is then compared to the subsequent bracket.
More formally, let W denote the “true” estimate of each respondent’s
willingness to pay. In playing the iterative bidding game, the respondents
are asked whether would have been willing to pay b1 to visit the health
2We measured visit urgency on a scale from 1 to 5. One corresponds to a benign cold,
three corresponds to infectious mononucleosis, and ﬁve corresponds to an emergency room
visit.
4center. The respondent’s answer then reveals whether their willingness to
pay estimate lies above or below b1, the entry point into the game. If the
respondent answers no, he asked if he would be willing to pay b2 < b1.
Alternatively, if the respondent answers yes, he is asked if he would be willing
to pay b2 > b1. This pattern of questioning is repeated until bracket bi is
reached such that exactly one of the following is true:
If W < b1 then bi−1 > W > bi and b1 > b2 > ... > bi−1 > bi (1)
If W > b1 then bi−1 < W < bi and b1 < b2 < ... < bi−1 < bi (2)
The end result is an interval between bi and bi−1 in which each respon-
dent’s willingness to pay lies. However, this approach ignores any anchoring
eﬀect that may be inﬂuencing respondents’ stated willingness to pay. In-
stead, the observed willingness to pay can be thought of as a function of
one’s true willingness to pay and the ﬁrst entry point, b1.
Let W be the respondent’s “true” willingness to pay estimate; let ˜ W be
the reported willingness to pay estimate that is formed after the respondent
is shown b1, and let α ∈ [0,1] be a constant that mediates the extent of
anchoring bias. Herriges and Shogren (1996) propose the following arithmetic
model for the anchoring bias:
˜ W = (1 − α)W + αb1 (3)
Instead, we model the anchoring eﬀect as a geometric average of b1 and
W:3
ln ˜ W = (1 − α)lnW + αlnb1 (4)
In this model, reported willingness to pay is a weighted geometric average
of the true willingness to pay and the entry value. As α increases, so does
the extent of anchoring bias. At α = 1, there is complete anchoring so that
a respondent will report ˜ W = b1 regardless of his true willingness to pay. On
the other hand, at α = 0, there is no anchoring bias and ˜ W = W.
According to models (3) and (4), when the ﬁrst bracket question is asked,
a respondent will compare his “true” willingness to pay with b1. In answering
3The main advantage of a geometric model over an arithmetic form is that a geometric
model restricts W to nonnegative values whereas an algebraic model could lower the “true”
willingness to pay estimate to a negative value, which makes little sense in our context.
5this ﬁrst question, the respondent will be biased toward b1 in his response.
However, the reported answer will be on the same side as W, the “true”
willingness to pay. Thus, the answer to the ﬁrst question can be taken at
face value. On the other hand, all subsequent questions cannot be taken at
face value in that they are comparing the bracket amount bi to the reported
willingness to pay estimate ˜ W.
The survey data from the iterative bidding game come in the form of
intervals around the reported willingness to pay:
bi−1 > ˜ W > bi if (1) holds, or
bi−1 < ˜ W < bi if (2) holds.
However, we are interested in W, not ˜ W. Applying (4), we rewrite the
above equations as follows:
bi−1 > exp((1 − α)lnW + αlnb1) > bi if (1) holds.
bi−1 < exp((1 − α)lnW + αlnb1) < bi if (2) holds.
We use maximum likelihood methods to estimate the model. We assume
that the “true” willingness to pay for health care follows a three parameter
Gamma distribution. We assume that willingness to pay comes from an
independent draw of a random variable, W, with the following cumulative
distribution (which can be expressed in terms of the lower incomplete gamma
function γ): 4











for w ≥ 0, w ≥ g, and k,b,g > 0.
With (5) and the data, we can calculate the probability that we observe
the sample that we actually observe. If (1) holds:
4Here k is the shape parameter, b is the scale parameter, and g is the location parameter
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Let A1 represent the set of respondents for whom (1) holds (true willing-
ness to pay is below b1) and let A2 represent the set of respondents for whom













bn,i−1 < ˜ Wn < bn,i
￿
(6)
Our goal is to estimate α, k, b, and g. We are also interested in how
some important characteristics of each respondent, X, aﬀect willingness to
pay as well and the anchoring eﬀect. The X vector includes demographic
characteristics (such as race, income, and graduate student status) as well as
health status characteristics.5 We parameterize the dependence of k, b and
















This parameterization restricts k > 0, b > 0, and 0 < α < 1, as is required
for the Gamma distribution.
As is typical for maximum likelihood methods, our estimates of the sensi-
tivity of the willingness to pay to covariates and to anchoring bias will depend
in part on our distributional assumptions. While we cannot directly test our
assumption that the “true”willingness to pay distribution is a member of
5Whether a student is “Low income” is deﬁned by whether the student’s annual house-
hold income is less than $25,000 (for graduate students) or by whether the student is on
ﬁnancial aid (for undergraduates).
6When allowing for α to depend upon X, the function could not be maximized using
standard hill climbing methods or through a grid search. Instead, Z contains a subset
of the characteristics from X which might theoretically aﬀect the level of anchoring or
for which there is evidence of this when estimating the model separately for diﬀerent
subgroups.
7the three-parameter gamma family, we can conduct some tests to examine
whether this distributional assumption is plausible. In particular, we run
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to see if the underlying probability distribution
(the reported willingness to pay distribution ˜ W) diﬀers from our hypothe-
sized distributions. At the 5% level, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
observed willingness to pay was generated by the three parameter gamma
distribution implied by our maximum likelihood estimates.7
Table 3 shows the eﬀect of covariates on the willingness to pay distribution
(that is, the parameters of the gamma distribution). Because covariates enter
in diﬀerent parameters of the distribution, we report in Table 4 the marginal
eﬀect of each covariate on willingness to pay, E(f(x = 1)) − E(f(x = 0)),
and calculate variances using an asymptotic bootstrap. 8 We ﬁnd that sicker
students have a higher willingness to pay, while low-income individuals and
those with chronic conditions have a lower willingness to pay. In dollar terms,
students with more urgent symptoms are willing to pay about $10 more on
average than those with less urgent symptoms, while low-income students
and those with chronic conditions have a willingness to pay of $7 dollars and
$4 less, respectively.9
Table 5 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the eﬀect of anchor-
ing. Aside from the fact that we can reject the hypothesis that α = 0 (no
anchoring bias) at the 0.01 level for every subgroup, it is diﬃcult to interpret
the parameter estimates. We simulate some scenarios that make more clear
what our estimates mean:
• Starting the bidding game at $50 results in willingness to pay estimates
over $7 higher on average than when starting at $5, an increase of about
60%.
7We also tried other functional form assumptions, including an exponential distribu-
tion, a weibull distribution, and a two-parameter Gamma distribution. Based upon the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the three parameter gamma provided the best ﬁt among
these, and it was the only distribution to not be rejected by the test.
8Under standard assumptions for maximum likelihood methods, our parameter esti-
mates are asymptotically distributed joint normal. We run the asymptotic bootstrap by
taking 1000 draws from the asymptotic joint distribution of the parameters. For each draw
and for each parameter, we calculate E(f(x = 1)) − E(f(x = 0)).
9Even though these latter groups are not willing to pay as much for Vaden services,
we ﬁnd in results not reported here (see Isen, 2006) that the low-income and those with
chronic conditions would not be deterred from seeking care for urgent symptoms with
modest cost sharing levels.
8• When pooling all the brackets in the sample (where some of the an-
choring is randomly dispersed throughout the distribution), we still get
a willingness to pay estimate that is upwardly biased by approximately
9%.
• The bias in the price elasticity implied by this estimate varies between
9% and 80% depending upon the starting bracket, and when pooling
all the brackets, the bias is 27%
The anchoring eﬀect varies for diﬀerent subgroups of students. To simplify
the interpretation of results, we report the marginal eﬀect on α of changing
each covariate from zero to one. The only statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is for white students; relative to non-whites, anchoring is lower for white
students by 0.135 points. One possible explanation for this result is that,
as the literature on racial disparities in health care has documented, whites
tend to use more health care services in their lifetime; perhaps individuals
with more experience with a good are less aﬀected by anchoring.
4 Acquiescence Bias
To test for acquiescence bias, we compare the responses of students for whom
the ﬁrst bracket question in the iterative bidding game was posed with a
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer against students for whom the ﬁrst question was more
neutrally worded. Recall that students were assigned the form of this ﬁrst
question randomly. We run a probit regression of whether a participant
would have visited the health center (for his last visit) if he had had to pay a
fee equivalent to his ﬁrst bracket amount against an indicator for whether the
participant was assigned the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ form of the ﬁrst bracket question.
Table 6 shows the results for this test in column 1. The probability of
answering in the aﬃrmative to the ﬁrst bracket when given a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
question increases by 11.7 percentage points, which makes these students
35% more likely to answer in the aﬃrmative relative to the main sample of
students. This is strong evidence of acquiescence bias. The other results are
unsurprising–an increase in the (randomly assigned) fee students are asked
if they would pay reduces the likelihood they answer in the aﬃrmative, low
income students are less willing to visit despite a fee, chronically ill students
and those with urgent medical conditions are more willing.
9We turn now to measuring the eﬀect of anchoring bias on the measured
willingness to pay. We do this by ﬁrst regressing the “true” willingness to
pay estimates (corrected for anchoring bias using the method described in
Section 3) on whether respondents were exposed to the neutral version of
the ﬁrst bracket question in the iterative bidding game. We then take these
ﬁtted values to those exposed to the non-neutral wording to predict what
their willingness to pay would have been and compare them to those exposed
to the neutral wording.
The results are in the second column of Table 6. Non-neutral wording
leads to a willingness to pay estimate that is upwardly biased by around 30%
as well as an elasticity estimate that is downwardly biased by around 20%.
It is clear from these results that posing the ﬁrst bracket entry question in
a non-neutral manner causes a substantive bias. In the rest of the paper,
we thus analyze only the subgroup of respondents who were posed a neutral
version of that ﬁrst question.
5 Willingness to Pay and Estimated Demand
Elasticities.
From Section 3, we obtain an estimate of each students’ true willingness to
pay interval for health care that is purged of anchoring bias using (4). For
this section, let s be a unique identiﬁer for each student and let the pair
(˜ bs
i−1, ˜ bs
i) be the purged bounds on willingness to pay for student s from the
iterative bidding game. We estimate Ws using the following equation, which
is implied by our distributional assumption (5):


















The demand curve for health care at Stanford is deﬁned as a function,
Q(P), which represents the number of visits to Vaden over a year at price, P.
The empirical analog of this object, say ˆ Q(P), in our context is the number
of students in our sample, weighted by their number of visits in the previous




vs1(Ws ≥ P) (8)
Figure 1 shows a non-parametric plot of lnQ(P) against lnP. It also
shows the best ﬁtting quadratic curve that approximates this plot. When
price is set at the mean student willingness to pay, the elasticity of demand
dlnQ
dlnP equals −0.7.
While the famous RAND study found a price demand elasticity for all
health care service in the general population to be about −0.2, the estimate
for ﬁrst tier care at Stanford is not very surprising. After all, the Stanford
population is healthier than the general population, the student health center
provides only ﬁrst tier care, and all students possess other medical insurance
which serves as a close substitute for the care available at Stanford student
health. Demand elasticities at levels close to one such as this imply that cost
sharing would increase welfare by stemming moral hazard and the overuse
of medical care. Additionally, given the low average willingness to pay of
$15.28, the gains from risk pooling are limited.
6 Bias From Selective Non-Response
Although we contacted a random sample of Stanford students for the survey,
response rates were low enough—30.8%—to raise concern about the repre-
sentativeness of our ﬁnal sample. We use two diﬀerent methods to address
the possibility that our willingness to pay estimates are biased by the high
rate of non-response.
First, we estimate a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). The
Stanford Administration provided demographic information on all individu-
als generated in the random sample, whether or not the student replied to
our survey. We used these demographic data to match respondents and non-
respondents in the context of a Heckman selection model. In the ﬁrst stage,
we model whether a student responded to the survey, and in the second stage
we model respondents’ ‘true’ willingness to pay, adjusted for anchoring bias.
We use the $5 gift certiﬁcate that we oﬀered to a randomized subset of re-
spondents as an instrumental variable. Though the Heckman selection model
is identiﬁed by functional form assumptions without any required exclusion
restrictions, having a plausible instrumental variable makes the estimates
11more believable. We include an indicator for whether each student was of-
fered a participation incentive in the ﬁrst stage, but not in the second stage.
Table 7 shows the results from the Heckman selection model. The prob-
ability of responding is increased by 5.8% when a student is oﬀered com-
pensation, but the coeﬃcient on the inverse Mills ratio in the second stage
indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no selection bias.
While these results are suggestive, we do not view them as deﬁnitive. The
Heckman selection model requires a strong and untestable functional form
assumption about the joint distribution of the errors in the selection and
outcome equations–bivariate normality. We thus turn to bounding methods
to see how sensitive our estimates are to the possibility of non-response bias.
We estimate three diﬀerent sets of bounds: (1) the (eﬀectively) assumption-
free bounds of Manski (1990); (2) the Manski instrumental variables (IV)
bounds (Manski and Pepper, 2000); and (3) the structural bounds of (Philip-
son, 2001) which require both an instrumental variable and some structural
assumptions about the eﬀects of selection.10 We use the randomized partici-
pation incentive as our instrumental variable for the Manski IV bounds and
the structural bounds.
Let W1 be the (anchoring corrected) willingness to pay among people who
responded to the survey and let W0 be the anchoring corrected willingness
to pay among people who did not respond. Let D be an indicator of whether
a student responded to the survey. We are interested in population mean
willingness to pay, W = DW1 + (1 − D)W0:
E[W] = E[DW1] + E[(1 − D)W0] (9)
= E[W1|D = 1]P[D = 1] + E[W0|D = 0]P[D = 0]
The terms E[W1|D = 1] and P[D = 1] are readily observable from the
data we have, but we do not observe E[Y0|D = 0], which is the mean will-
ingness to pay among the non-responders. We can, however, impose some a
priori bounds on it. Willingness to pay must not be negative: W0 > 0. Re-
placing E[W0|D = 0] with zero in (9) thus yields the following lower bound
on E[W] that depends only on observed quantities:
E[W] ≥ E[W1|D = 1]P[D = 1] (10)
10For related bounding approaches, see Shaikh and Vytlacil (2004); Bhattacharya et al.
(2005).
12Similarly, since our iterative bidding game has an upper end point, M =
$150, we have that W0 < M. Applying this inequality yields an upper bound
on E[W]:
E[W] ≤ E[W1|D = 1]P[D = 1] + MP[D = 0] (11)
Together (10) and (11) constitute the Manski bounds without an instru-
mental variable. These can be sharpened if an instrumental variable, such as
we have, is available.
Let ρ be an indicator for whether each person contacted was provided a
participation incentive. For an instrumental variable, we require that P[D =
1|ρ = 1] > P[D = 1|ρ = 0] (which holds in our data) and that E[W0|ρ] =
E[W0] and E[W1|ρ] = E[W1] (which we are willing to assume since ρ is
randomly assigned). Clearly, the latter assumptions imply that E[W] =
E[W|ρ] for all ρ. The Manski bounds above still hold conditional on ρ since
W is still bounded below by zero and above by M:
E[W1|D = 1,ρ]P[D = 1|ρ] ≤ E[W]
≤ E[W1|D = 1,ρ]P[D = 1|ρ] + MP[D = 0|ρ]
Applying the above inequalities twice–once for ρ = 1 and once for ρ = 0–
yields the Manski IV bounds:
max
ρ=0,1(E[W1|D = 1,ρ]P[D = 1|ρ]) ≤ E[W] ≤ (12)
min
ρ=0,1(E[W1|D = 1,ρ]P[D = 1|ρ] + MP[D = 0|ρ])
We can obtain tighter bounds with an additional structural assumption,
similar to that imposed by Philipson (2001). In particular, we assume that
students who responded to the survey about the health center are more likely
to have a higher willingness to pay for services from the center. This is a
plausible assumption since those who did not respond to the survey presum-
ably care less about student health services than those who did respond.11
11In our initial contact with each student, we included statements from the various
Stanford authorities emphasizing the importance of this research to improving student
health services. Those who care about these services seem more likely to respond to such
statements by responding to the survey.
13Our randomized incentive provides further evidence that this assumption is
reasonable. Among those provided the incentive, average WTP is $13.66
while for those not so provided, it is $15.44. Since those provided the incen-
tive were more likely to respond, these results support the idea that students
who are willing to pay more for student health services are more likely to
respond (notwithstanding our results from the Heckman selection model).
Formally, this assumption amounts to the following:
E[W0|D = 0,ρ = r] < E[W1|D = 1,ρ = r] for r = 0,1.
Unlike the assumptions imposed for the Heckman selection model, these
structural assumptions are not tight enough to ensure point identiﬁcation.
Imposing the above structural assumption on (9) yields the following bound
on the population mean willingness to pay:
max
ρ=0,1(E[W1|D = 1,ρ]P[D = 1|ρ]) ≤ E[W] ≤ (13)
min
ρ=0,1(E[W1|D = 1,ρ])
Finally, we calculate the elasticity of demand at the extreme point of each
bound. We need one more piece of notation. Let N be the size of the sample
contacted (and let n be the number of responders). We are interested in the




1(Ws ≥ P) =
n−1 X
s=1
1(Ws ≥ P) +
N−n−1 X
s=1
1(W s ≥ P) (14)
We observe in the right hand equation the ﬁrst term but not the second,
which is the non-responder quantity at each given price. At the lower bound,
we set the willingness to pay of each non-responders to the lowest price level,




1(Ws ≥ P) where Ws = min P for 1 < s < N − n − 1 (15)
12For simplicity, we do not weight by the number of visits for each student in the previous
year in this section. If one wishes to include the weight, one can use the total number of
visits in the last year to determine the number of visits of non-responders and construct
the bounds accordingly, which in our case, provides very similar results.
14The elasticity at the upper bound follows in a similar way where we set




1(Ws ≥ P) where Ws = max P for 1 < s < N − n − 1 (16)
Together (15) and (16) constitute the elasticity corresponding to the Man-
ski bounds without an instrumental variable (where the elasticity
dlnQ
dlnP is
evaluated at the mean willingness to pay of the quadratic demand approxi-
mation). Similar logic applies in constructing the elasticities corresponding
to the narrower bounds.
The results, in Table 8, indicate a much tighter set of willingness to pay
estimates as we move from the Manski bounds, to the Manski IV bounds, to
the structural bounds. While the elasticity estimates at the extreme points
of the Manski bounds and the Manski IV bounds are substantively wide, the
elasticity estimates at the extreme points of the structural bounds are nearly
identical to the elasticity estimate (uncorrected for selection bias) that we
report in Section 5.
7 Conclusion
While contingent valuation games are an important method used to calcu-
late demand when prices are diﬃcult or impossible to observe, in practice the
method can be subject to a number of problematic biases, including anchor-
ing and acquiescence biases. In a survey context, selective non-response by
those who care least about the good being valued may also lead to incorrect
inferences. In this paper, we demonstrate ways to adjust inferences from an
iterative bidding game that simultaneously accounts for all three of these
sources of bias.
In our example of calculating the demand curve for student health at
Stanford University, it is useful to see how large the bias in the willingness
to pay estimate and the elasticity estimate is induced by each type of bias
separately. We show in Table 9 the relative eﬀects of anchoring, acquiescence,
and selection biases on willingness to pay and elasticity:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
WTPbiased − WTPcorrected
WTPcorrected
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Elasticity biased − Elasticity corrected
Elasticity corrected
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
15In our context, it appears that anchoring and acquiescence are of similar
magnitude in biasing the results whereas selection appears to do little in
biasing the elasticity (although may bias willingness to pay estimates).
Anchoring bias can be overcome by using random bracket entry and cre-
ating a model to assess and control for the eﬀect. Some studies have only
used random bracket entry (for example Asgary et al., 2004, and the Health
and Retirement Survey), but the results from pooling all of the brackets indi-
cate that it is important to also estimate an anchoring model. Acquiescence
bias can be signiﬁcantly reduced by avoiding “yes” or “no” questions.
Lastly, even though we ﬁnd that selection bias is of little concern for
our elasticity estimate, it is useful to induce a higher response rate among a
random subsample, through randomized payment incentives or by expending
more eﬀort to elicit responses. These strategies make possible robust infer-
ence in the face of selective non-response. In particular, they provide both
an unassailable exclusion restriction for the ﬁrst stage of a selection model,
and they permit the construction of tighter bounds on the bias from nonre-
sponse. When all of these strategies are combined, they yield more plausible
estimates of demand from iterative bidding games in the contingent valuation
tradition.
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17Table 1: Demographic and Health Descriptive Statistics
Category Variable All Undergrad. Grad.
Sex Male 47% 38% 53%
Race/Ethnicity White 60% 58% 62%
(People may report Black 6% 10% 3%
multiple races) Asian 29% 26% 31%
Latino 10% 12% 9%
On Financial Aid Yes 46% 46% -
No 54% 54% -
Parent Education High School 7% 7% -
Some College 6% 6% -
College 16% 16% -
Graduate School 71% 71% -
Household Income <$25K 37% - 37%
(Grad. students $25K-$35K 37% - 37%
only) $35K-$55K 10% - 10%
>$55K 17% - 17%
Health Insurance Through Stanford? 58% 29% 62%
Health Status Excellent 29% 29% -
Very Good 53% 53% -
Good 13% 13% -
Fair 4% 4% -
Poor 1% 1% -
Med. Condition 16% 17% 15%
Sample Size 883 382 501
18Table 2: Descriptive Statistics About Health Care
Category Variable All Undergrad. Grad.
2005 Visits None 25% 11% 12%
1 visit 18% 24% 19%
2-3 visits 36% 43% 41%
4-5 visits 12% 11% 16%
6+ visits 10% 11% 11%
Urgency of Last Visit 1 39% 35% 43%
1 = not urgent 2 32% 34% 30%
5 = most urgent 3 20% 26% 20%
4 5% 6% 5%
5 3% 5% 2%
Reason for Last Visit Digestive 8% 8% 8%
(May report Dermatological 13% 12% 14%
multiple reasons) Ear/Nose/Throat 33% 37% 30%
Migraine/Headache 5% 6% 4%
Gynecological 23% 22% 23%
Mental Health 11% 13% 10%
Chest 4% 3% 3%
Lethargy 4% 6% 3%
Cold/Fever/Flu 24% 31% 20%
Willingness-to-pay All brackets $16.83 $14.27 $18.79
by starting bracket $5 bracket $13.20 $8.51 $16.81
$20 bracket $15.27 $11.94 $17.88
$35 bracket $17.96 $16.80 $18.80
$50 bracket $20.79 $19.76 $21.59
Answer in the Neutral wording 27.41% 21.99% 31.54%
aﬃrmative to ﬁrst Non-neutral wording 38.10% 36.07% 40.00%
bracket question
“Digestive” indicates vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, or blood in stool.
“Ear/Nose/Throat” indicates allergies, cough, throat, eye problem, ear or hearing
problem, sinus problem, and diﬃculty breathing.
“Mental Health” indicates anxiety, depression, or other psychological problems.
“Chest” indicates chest pain and rapid or irregular heartbeat.
19Table 3: Willingness to Pay Estimates
Shape Scale Location
Variable Param. k Param. b Param. g
More than 1 visit −0.200 0.057 -
(0.171) (0.203)
Chronic Condition 0.071 −0.365 -
(0.229) (0.249)
Student health insurance −0.010 0.216 -
(0.127) (0.157)
Low Income −0.008 −0.459∗∗ -
(0.113) (0.145)
Nonurgent 0.120 −0.668∗∗ -
(0.113) (0.155)
Graduate Student 0.529∗∗ −0.156 -
(0.183) (0.220)
White 0.293 0.004 -
(0.223) (0.255)
Constant −0.887∗∗ 3.762∗∗ 0.989
(0.236) (0.286) (0.409)
N 883
Standard errors are included in parantheses. Log-likelihood = -1737.48
** signiﬁcant at 1%
* signiﬁcant at 5%
20Table 4: Eﬀect of coeﬃcients on WTP
Variable F(x = 1) − F(x = 0)














Standard errors are included in parantheses and con-
structed by an asymptotic bootstrap
** signiﬁcant at 1%
* signiﬁcant at 5%
21Table 5: Anchoring Results
α(Z = 1)−
Z Estimates α(Z = 0)
More than 1 visit 0.217 0.034
(0.385)
Chronic Condition 0.377 0.058
(0.434)






Sample Anchoring Mean (α) 0.203
N 883
Standard errors are included in parentheses
** signiﬁcant at 1%
* signiﬁcant at 5%
22Table 6: Tests for Acquiescence Bias
Eﬀect on First
Bracket Question Eﬀect on WTP
Variable Marginal Eﬀect Estimate
Non-neutral question 0.117∗∗∗ 4.45∗∗
(0.0473) (2.00)
First bracket amount −0.0111∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.000891) (0.04)
Undergradate student −0.106∗∗∗ −5.11∗∗∗
(0.0284) (1.33)
Low Income −0.0890∗∗∗ −5.30∗∗∗
(0.0291) ( 1.36)




Chronic condition 0.0867∗∗ −4.10∗
(0.0354) (1.81)







All estimates are reported as changes in the probability of being
willing to come for visit despite a fee equal to b1 being charged.
Standard errors are included in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%
** signiﬁcant at 5%
* signiﬁcant at 10%
23Table 7: Heckman Selection Correction Model
Responded
Variable to Survey WTP




Student Health Insurance −0.017 4.09∗∗∗
(0.018) (1.59)
Graduate Student 0.088∗∗∗ −2.69
(0.031) (2.86)
Professional Student −0.069∗∗ 8.44∗∗∗
(0.027) (2.69)
PhD Student −0.080∗∗∗ 3.40
(0.026) (2.55)
BA Student −0.090∗∗∗ 0.92
(0.024) (3.07)
BS Student −0.102∗∗∗ −1.46
(0.025) (3.54)











We report marginal eﬀect estimates rather than coeﬃ-
cients throughout.
Standard errors are included in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%
** signiﬁcant at 5%
* signiﬁcant at 10%
24Table 8: Non-Response Bias–Bounding Estimates
Bounds
Manski Manski IV Structural
WTP Lower Bound 5.69 5.89 5.89
WTP Upper Bound 103.77 97.30 13.66
Elasticity Lower Bound -.06 -.08 -.72
Elasticity Upper Bound -.76 -.72 -.72
Table 9: Magnitude of Biases
WTP Bias Elasticity Bias
Anchoring Pooled brackets 7.7% 27.4%
$5 bracket 20.3% 9.3%
$50 bracket 27.2% 80.1%
Acquiescense Non-neutral wording 29.2% 19.3%
Selection Heckman correction 0% 0%
Structural bounding 11.7 - 159.0% 3.3-3.7%
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